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Abstract
We introduce a robust sensor design framework to provide defense against attackers that can bypass/hijack the
existing defense mechanisms. For effective control, such attackers would still need to have access to the state of
the system because of the presence of plant noise. We design “affine” sensor outputs to control their perception
of the system so that their adversarial intentions would not be fulfilled or even inadvertently end up having a
positive impact. The specific model we adopt is a Gauss-Markov process driven by a controller with a “private”
malicious/benign quadratic control objective. We seek to defend against the worst possible distribution over the
controllers’ objectives in a robust way. Under the solution concept of game-theoretic hierarchical equilibrium, we
obtain a semi-definite programming problem equivalent to the problem faced by the sensor against a controller with
an arbitrary, but known control objective even when the sensor has noisy measurements. Based on this equivalence
relationship, we provide an algorithm to compute the optimal affine sensor outputs. Finally, we analyze the ensuing
performance numerically for various scenarios.
Index Terms
Stackelberg games, Stochastic control, Cyber-physical systems, Security, Advanced persistent threats, Sensor
placement, Semi-definite programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
CYBER connectedness of physical systems makes them vulnerable against cyber attacks which could haveundesirable physical outcomes, e.g., damages [1], [2]. Different from the vulnerability of computer systems
in a cyber network, cyber connectedness of physical systems brings in new and distinct security challenges due to
the inherent physical dynamics. Cyber attacks can be very strategic while disturbing the system to achieve certain
malicious goal and therefore they differ from external disturbances that can be modeled, e.g., statistically or within
certain bounds, for robust control system design. Cyber attacks can be advanced and very target specific by learning
the system’s dynamics and tuning their attack specific to the underlying system and the existing defensive measures
for success and stealthiness. To cite a recent occurrence of such an event, in 2014, Dragonfly Malware intervened
the operation of many cyber-physical, e.g., process control, systems in energy and pharmaceutical industries across
the world over a long period of time without being detected [3]. Therefore, it is crucial that we develop novel
security mechanisms against such attackers for the security of cyber-physical systems.
A. Prior Literature
In a physical system, advance attackers can seek to evade detection mechanisms by manipulating the physical
signals used by the detectors. For example, in [4], the authors have introduced false data injection attacks, where the
attackers can inject data into the sensor outputs, in the context of state estimation, and characterized undetectable
attacks. The ensuing studies mainly focused on characterizing the vulnerabilities of control systems against such
evasive attacks and designing counter measures to be able to detect them. In [5], the authors have introduced replay
attacks where the attacker records and replays the sensor outputs when the system is at steady state since they are
expected to be similar. As a counter measure, an independent signal can be injected into the control input to detect
such attacks at the expense of degradation in control performance [5], [6]. In [7], [8], the authors have characterized
the reachable set that an evasive attacker can drive the system by injecting data into sensor outputs and control
inputs jointly.
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2Within deterministic control scenarios, in [9], the authors have analyzed open-loop stealthy attacks, and proposed
to add new measurements as a counter measure, as in [5]. In [10], the authors have formulated the limitations of
monitoring-based detection mechanisms against false data injection and replay attacks. In [11], the authors have
proposed decoding schemes to estimate the state based on sensor outputs while a subset of them could have been
under attack. The attackers can also have adversarial control objectives. In [12], [13], the authors have analyzed
such attacks, where the attacker seeks to drive the state of the system according to his adversarial goal evasively by
manipulating sensor outputs and control inputs jointly. In [14], the authors have analyzed optimal attack strategies to
maximize the quadratic cost of a system with linear Gaussian dynamics without being detected. In [15], the authors
have proposed linear encoding schemes for sensor outputs of an LQG system in order to enhance detectability of
false data injection attacks while the encoding matrix is assumed oblivious to the attackers.
B. Motivation
Specifically, we address, in this paper, primarily the following two questions: “If we have already designed the
sensor outputs, in a non-Bayesian setting, to what extent would we have secured the system against multiple type
advanced and evasive attackers who can bypass/hijack the defensive measures to fulfill a certain malicious control
objective?” And “what would be the best affine sensor outputs that can deceive such attackers about the underlying
state of the system so that their actions/attacks would not lead to any degradation?” We consider attackers who
have malicious control objectives misaligned with the normal operation of the system, but not completely opposite
of it as in the framework of a zero-sum game. This implies that there is a part of the malicious objective that is
benign. Correspondingly, the attacker would be acting in line with the normal operation of the system with respect
to the aligned part of his objective. Our motivation is to restrain the attacker’s abilities so that he will not act along
the misaligned part of the objectives while taking actions in line with the aligned part. To this end, we propose to
design the information available to an attacker strategically since the attacker would be making decisions to fulfill
his malicious objective based on the information available to him. By designing the sensor outputs strategically,
our goal is to control the attacker’s perception about the underlying system, and correspondingly to persuade the
attacker (without any explicit enforcement) to fulfill the aligned part of the objectives as much as possible without
fulfilling the misaligned part.
We have partially addressed this challenge in [16]–[18], in non-cooperative communication and control settings.
For a discrete-time Gauss Markov process, and when the sender and the receiver in a non-cooperative communication
setting have misaligned quadratic objectives, in [16], we have shown the optimality of linear signaling rules within
the general class of measurable policies and provided an algorithm to compute the optimal policies numerically.
Also in [16], we have formulated the optimal linear signaling rule in a non-cooperative LQG setting when the
sensor and the controller have known misaligned control objectives. In [17], [18], we have introduced a secure
sensor design framework, where we addressed the optimal linear signaling rule again in a non-cooperative LQG
setting when the sensor and private-type controller have misaligned control objectives in a Bayesian setting, i.e.,
the distribution over the private type of the controller is known. This paper differs from these earlier studies by
addressing optimal affine signaling in a non-Bayesian setting, where the distribution over the private type of the
controller is not known, in a robust way. Furthermore here we provide a comprehensive formulation by considering
also the cases where the sensor could have partial or noisy information on the signal of interest and relevance.
Further details on this will be given next as part of our description of the main contributions of this work, as well
as throughout the paper.
C. Contributions
To obtain explicit results, we specifically consider systems with linear Gaussian dynamics and quadratic control
objectives, which have various industrial applications [14] from manufacturing processes to aerospace control.
We consider the possibility of adversarial intervention by multiple advanced and evasive attackers across control
networks. The attackers have different long term control objectives. Due to the stochastic nature of the problem,
i.e., due to the presence of state noise, any open-loop control strategy of an attacker could not drive the system
along his desired path effectively. Therefore, regardless of whether the controller has an adversarial objective or
not, it has to generate a closed-loop control input using the designed sensor outputs. We also consider the scenarios
where the advanced attackers could learn the relationship between the sensor output and the state, i.e., the designed
3signaling rule1, in order to avoid any obscurity based defense, which can be bypassed once the advanced attacker
learns the information in obscurity. This implies that the interaction between the sensor and the attackers could
be modeled as a hierarchical dynamic game [19], where the sensor leads the game by announcing its strategy in
advance. Therefore, while designing the sensor outputs, we should consider the possibility of malicious or benign
control inputs and defend against the worst possible distribution over them.
Specifically, we seek to determine optimal affine sensor strategies for controlled Gauss-Markov processes. The
sensor can have partial or noisy measurements while in [16]–[18] the sensor is considered to have access to the
underlying state perfectly. We only consider affine signaling rules, since under such rules our setting entails a
classical information model, whereas without such a structural restriction on the signaling rules, the underlying
model features a non-classical information due to the asymmetry of information between the players and the
dynamic interaction through closed-loop feedback signals. Different from our previous works [16]–[18], here, the
follower, i.e., the attacker, has a private type while the distribution over the types is not known by the leader, i.e.,
the sensor. Our goal is to defend against the worst possible distribution over these types. To this end, we provide
an equivalent problem faced by the sensor in terms of the covariance of the posterior estimate of the (control-free)
state by formulating the necessary and sufficient conditions on that covariance matrix. This new equivalent problem
is linear in the optimization argument with a compact and convex constraint set.
We emphasize that what we have is an exact equivalence relation, and not like the equivalence in optimality,
shown in [16]. Based on this exact equivalence relation, we can provide an offline algorithm to compute the
optimal affine sensor strategies. In particular, in order to determine the best signaling rule against multiple types
of attackers, we introduce additional constraints on the equivalent problem, which implies that the equivalence in
optimality is not a sufficient condition in that respect. We had noted in [17], [18] for multiple attack types with
known distribution over them that the optimum can be attained at the extreme points of the constraint set since
the equivalent problem is linear in the optimization argument and the constraint set is compact and convex [20].
And, further the corresponding covariance matrices could be attained through certain linear signaling rules, where
the sensor does not introduce any additional independent noise. However, when we defend against multiple types
of attackers with the worst possible distribution over them as here, the new problem imposes additional linear
constraints on the equivalent problem. With these new constraints, even though the optimum will be attained at
the extreme points of this modified constraint set, there can be cases where the optimum may be attained only
at non-extreme points of the original constraint set before the modification. Such covariance matrices could be
attained through certain affine signaling rules, where the sensor can introduce additional independent noise.
We now list the main contributions of this paper as follows:
• We introduce a robust sensor design agent that can craft the measurements sent to the noiseless communication
network in order to defend against multiple advanced and evasive attackers with long term control objectives
that are misaligned with the normal operation of the system.
• We model the interaction between the sensor and the attackers, with private types, as a multi-stage Stackelberg
game, where the sensor is the leader. Particularly, we suppose that the advanced attackers could be aware of
the sensor’s strategies in order to avoid the vulnerability of obscurity based defenses.
• We provide another problem equivalent to the problem faced by the sensor against any known type of attacker
for compact computation of robust sensor outputs against the worst possible distribution over the attacker
types.
• We show the optimality of memoryless signaling rules within the general class of signaling rules with com-
plete/bounded memory when the sensor has access to the underlying state of the system.
• We show that certain affine signaling rules can lead to any covariance of the posterior estimate of the (control-
free) state in between the extremes of disclosing nothing and disclosing the measurements fully according to
a certain ordering of the covariance matrices.
• We show that the optimal signaling rule dictates the sensor to possibly introduce additive independent noise
into the sensor outputs if there are multiple types of attackers in a non-Bayesian setting.
• We provide a numerical algorithm to compute the optimal affine robust sensor design strategies.
• We extend the results to the cases where the sensor has partial or noisy information on the signal of interest
and relevance.
1In this paper, we use the terms “signaling rule” and “strategy” interchangeably.
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Fig. 1: Cyber-physical systems equipped with sensor design component in the physical part as a deceptive defense
mechanism against advanced evasive attackers who can intervene through the noiseless communication channel,
e.g, controller area network (CAN bus) in a vehicle.
• We examine the performance of the proposed framework for various scenarios, displaying the significant impact
of strategic design of sensor outputs on the system’s performance.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we formulate the robust sensor design game. In Section III, we
analyze the equilibrium of the robust sensor design game under perfect measurements. In Section IV, we extend
the results to the cases where there are partial or noisy measurements. In Section V, we examine numerically
the performance of the proposed scheme for various scenarios. We conclude the paper in Section VI with several
remarks and possible research directions. An appendix provides two technical results in support of some analyses
in the main body of the paper.
Notation: For an ordered set of parameters, e.g., x1, . . . ,xκ , we define xk:l := xk, . . . ,xl , where 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ κ .
N(0, .) denotes the multivariate Gaussian distribution with zero mean and designated covariance. We denote random
variables by bold lower case letters, e.g., x. For a random vector, e.g., x, cov{x} denotes the corresponding covariance
matrix. For a vector x and a matrix A, x′ and A′ denote their transposes, and ‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean (L2) norm of
the vector x. For a matrix A, Tr{A} denotes its trace. We denote the identity and zero matrices with the associated
dimensions by I and O, respectively. For positive semi-definite matrices A and B, A B means that A−B is also a
positive semi-definite matrix. Sm (or Sm+) denotes the set of symmetric (or positive definite) matrices of dimensions
m-by-m. A⊗B denotes the Kronecker product of the matrices A and B.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a cyber-physical control system, seen in Fig. 1, whose underlying state dynamics and sensor measure-
ments are described, respectively, by:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk +wk, (1)
yk =Cxk +vk, (2)
for k = 1, . . . ,κ , where2 A ∈ Rm×m,B ∈ Rm×r, and C ∈ Rm×m, and the initial state x1 ∼ N(0,Σ1). The additive
state and measurement noise sequences {wk} and {vk}, respectively, are white Gaussian vector processes, i.e.,
2Even though we consider time invariant matrices A,B, and C, for notational simplicity, the provided results could be extended to time-
variant cases rather routinely. Furthermore, we consider all the random parameters to have zero mean; however, the derivations can be
extended to non-zero mean case in a straight-forward way.
5wk ∼ N(0,Σw) and vk ∼ N(0,Σv); and are independent of the initial state x1 and of each other. As seen in Fig. 1,
the signal sk ∈ Rm, which can be different from the measurement yk ∈ Rm, is given by the affine signaling rule:
sk = ηk(y1:k) (3)
= L′k,kyk + . . .+L
′
k,1y1+nk, (4)
where Lk, j ∈ Rm×m, j = 1, . . . ,k, can be any deterministic matrix, and nk ∼ N(0,Θk) is independent of every other
parameter. Let ϒk denote the set of such affine signaling rules from Rmk to Rm, i.e., ηk ∈ ϒk. Furthermore, the
closed-loop control input uk ∈Rr, which is constructed by the controller located in the cyber-part of the system, is
given by
uk = γk(s1:k), (5)
almost everywhere over Rr, where γk(·) can be any Borel measurable function from Rmk to Rr. Let Γk denote the
set of all Borel measurable functions from Rmk to Rr, i.e., γk ∈ Γk.
Particularly, the dynamic system, measurement system, and actuators are located in the physical part while the
controller is located in the cyber part through a connection over a noiseless communication channel. However,
the connectivity over the channel is vulnerable to cyber attacks. We consider the scenarios where advanced and
evasive attackers can intervene through the channel by injecting malicious control inputs to drive the underlying
state according to a malicious long term control objective and can bypass or hijack the detection-based defensive
measures. Our goal is to produce defense against such advanced evasive attacks by crafting the attacker’s perceptions
about the underlying state of the system strategically so that their actions/attacks would not be harmful (to the
extent possible) and would be along the desired objectives. To this end, we introduce a robust-secure-sensor-design
component, denoted by S, in the physical plant that gets the sensor measurement yk as an input and constructs the
signal sk, given by (3), and feeds this signal to the noiseless communication channel. Even if there is an attacker
intervening over the channel, that attacker can only access that signal sk related to the underlying state of the
system.
Remark (Sensor Placement). Note that if the signal sk is memoryless, then sk ∈ Rm can be written as
sk = L′k,kC︸ ︷︷ ︸xk +L′k,kvk +nk︸ ︷︷ ︸
= C˜kxk + v˜k,
where v˜k ∼N(0,L′k,kΣvLk,k+Θk), such that C˜k ∈Rm×m is the gain matrix in the measurement while v˜k is the white
Gaussian measurement noise. Therefore, the optimal signaling rules η∗1:κ can provide a guideline to engineer (or
designer) the placement of the physical sensors to monitor the underlying state of the system securely or to assess
the resiliency against attacks with long-term control objectives. 4
The normal operation of the system, i.e., when there is no adversarial intervention by the attackers, is a stochastic
control setting, where the controller, denoted by C, constructs the control inputs uk ∈ Γk to minimize a finite horizon
quadratic cost function given by
E
{
κ
∑
k=1
‖xk+1‖2Q+‖uk‖2R
}
, (6)
where3 Q∈ Sm is positive-semi definite and R∈ Sr+ is positive definite. S selects the signaling rule η1:κ to minimize
the same cost function with C, i.e., (6), as a team. And if there were no possibility for an adversarial intervention,
S could be as informative as disclosing the measurement directly to C since there is no cost for the disclosed
information over the noiseless communication channel. However, as seen in Fig. 1, there can be advanced and
evasive adversarial interventions in the noiseless communication channel between the dynamic system and C. We
particularly consider multiple (finitely many) types of attackers who can inject malicious closed-loop control inputs
with long-term control objectives. Let type-α attacker’s cost function be given by
E
{
κ
∑
k=1
‖xk+1‖2Qα +‖uk‖2Rα
}
, (7)
3For notational simplicity, we consider time-invariant Q and R. However, the results provided could be extended to the general time-variant
case rather routinely.
6UωC (η1:κ ,γ
ω
1:κ) := E
{
κ
∑
k=1
‖xωk+1‖2Qω +‖γωk
(
ηk(yω1:k), . . . ,η1(y
ω
1 )
)‖2Rω
}
(8)
US(η1:κ ,{γω1:κ}ω∈Ω, p) := ∑
ω∈Ω
pωE
{
κ
∑
k=1
‖xωk+1‖2Q+‖γωk
(
ηk(yω1:k), . . . ,η1(y
ω
1 )
)‖2R
}
(9)
UA(η1:κ ,{γω1:κ}ω∈Ω, p) :=− ∑
ω∈Ω
pωE
{
κ
∑
k=1
‖xωk+1‖2Q+‖γωk
(
ηk(yω1:k), . . . ,η1(y
ω
1 )
)‖2R
}
(10)
where Qα ∈ Sm is positive semi-definite and Rα ∈ Sr is positive-definite.
Example (A Special Case). The attacker objective (7) also covers the special cases where the attacker seeks to
regularize the underlying state {xk} around an external process, e.g., {zαk }, rather than the zero vector. To this end,
we can consider the augmented state vector [x′k (zαk )′ ]
′ and set the associated weight matrix in the regularization,
i.e., Qα in (7), accordingly. 4
Since our aim is to defend against advanced and evasive attackers, we consider the scenarios where there exists
a hierarchy between the defender, i.e., S, and the attackers such that each type of attacker is aware of S’s signaling
rules η1:κ by testing and learning the system’s dynamics once they are deployed publicly. Different from [16]–[18],
in this paper, S does not know the underlying distribution governing the attackers’ types and seeks to defend against
the worst possible distribution. Particularly, S designs the secure sensor outputs such that S’s cost is minimized in
expectation with respect to the worst possible true distribution of types within a robust setting.
Remark (Game-theoretic View). This can be viewed as a game, where S designs the signaling rule η1:κ within
a hierarchical setting, where the controllers, C with different benign/malicious types, and the adversary (A),
determining the distribution of types, are aware of the signaling rules. Therefore, S anticipates reactions of different
types of controllers and the worst possible distribution over those types while selecting the signaling rule η1:κ to
minimize (6). 4
A. Game Model
We consider a game with three players: S, C, and A. C can have different private types. Let Ω denote the finite set
of all (benign/malicious) controller types. Correspondingly, depending on the type ω ∈Ω, C selects the control rule
γωk ∈ Γk. S designs the signaling rule η1:κ to minimize the expected cost, where the expectation is taken over all the
randomness (due to the initial state, and state and measurement noises), and the distribution of types, determined
by A. Let p := {pω}ω∈Ω denote the probabilities of types ω ∈Ω. Then, type-ω C’s, S’s, and A’s cost functions are
given by (8), (9), and (10), respectively, where we represent the dependence of the state on the controller’s type,
ω , due to the control input in the state recursion (1) explicitly through xωk (and the signal y
ω
k ) instead of xk (and
yk). Then, the robust sensor design game is defined as follows:
Definition (Robust Sensor Design Game). The robust sensor design game
G :=
(
ϒ1:κ ,Γ1:κ ,∆|Ω|,x1,w1:κ ,v1:κ
)
(11)
is a multi-stage Stackelberg game [19] between S, C, and A, with the following parameters:
• κ ∈ Z: denotes the number of stages, i.e., length of the horizon,
• x1 ∼ N(0,Σ1): denotes the initial state,
• {wk ∼ N(0,Σw)}: denotes the white state noise process independent of other parameters,
• {vk ∼ N(0,Σv)}: denotes the white measurement noise process independent of other parameters.
In this hierarchical setting, S is the leader, who announces (and commits to) his strategies beforehand, while
C and A are the followers, reacting to the leader’s announced strategies. C’s type is drawn according to A’s action
p ∈ ∆|Ω| and his strategy space is Γk at stage k. S’s strategy space is ϒk at each stage k and A’s action space is
7the simplex ∆|Ω|. Objectives of C, S, and A are given by (8), (9) and (10), respectively. The tuple of strategies
(η∗1:κ ,{γω∗1:κ}ω∈Ω, p∗) attains the Stackelberg equilibrium provided that
η∗1:κ = argmin
ηk∈ϒk
k=1,...,κ
US
(
η1:κ ,{γω∗1:κ(η1:κ)}ω∈Ω, p∗(η1:κ)
)
(12a)
γω∗1:κ(η1:κ) = argmin
γωk ∈Γk
k=1,...,κ
UωC
(
η1:κ ,γω1:κ(η1:κ)
)
, (12b)
p∗(η1:κ) = argmin
p∈∆|Ω|
UA
(
η1:κ ,{γω∗1:κ(η1:κ)}ω∈Ω, p(η1:κ)
)
(12c)
where, with abuse of notation, we denote type-ω C’s strategy γωk by γ
ω
k (η1:k) to show the dependence of type-ω C’s
strategies on S’s signaling rules due to the hierarchy, explicitly, and we define γω1:κ(η1:κ) := {γω1 (η1), . . . ,γωκ (η1:κ)}.
Remark (Uniqueness of Follower Reactions). The reaction set of type-ω C is an equivalence class such that all
γω∗1:κ in the reaction set lead to the same control input u
ω∗
k almost surely under certain convexity assumptions,
e.g., Rω  O is positive-definite, which will be shown in detail later. Furthermore, the reaction set of A is also an
equivalence class due to the zero-sum relation between the cost functions US and UA. 4
Remark (Decoupled Follower Objectives). Given S’s signaling rule, C’s objective UωC , for ω ∈Ω, is decoupled from
the other follower A’s action while A’s objective UA depends on different type C’s strategies. Therefore, this can
be viewed as a sequential optimization between the two followers, where firstly C selects his strategy optimizing
his objective (8) given the leader’s strategy, and then A takes action corresponding to the leader’s strategy and the
C’s optimal reaction to optimize his objective (10). 4
III. ROBUST SENSOR DESIGN FRAMEWORK
We first assume, in this section, that S has access to perfect measurements, i.e., yk = xk for k = 1, . . . ,κ; the
general noisy/partial measurements case will be addressed later in Section IV. Then, given p ∈ ∆|Ω|, S faces the
following optimization problem:
min
ηk∈ϒk
k=1,...,κ
US(η1:κ ,{γω∗1:κ(η1:κ)}ω∈Ω, p), (13)
where γω∗1:κ(η1:κ) is given by (12b). This is a highly nonlinear and non-convex problem. However, the following
theorem provides an equivalent semi-definite programming (SDP) problem, which is not limited to equivalence in
optimality as in [16], so that we can address the equilibrium for the robust sensor design game G in a compact
way.
Theorem 1 (Equivalence Result). Let the convex and compact set Ψ be defined as
Ψ :=
{
(Sk ∈ Sm)κk=1 |Σok  Sk  ASk−1A′,k = 1, . . . ,κ,S0 = O
}
, (14)
where Σok ∈ Sm is the covariance matrix of the control-free process:
xok+1 = Ax
o
k +wk and x
o
1 = x1, (15)
i.e., xok ∼ N(0,Σok) and4 Σok := E{xok(xok)′}. Then, given p ∈ ∆|Ω|, for any signaling rule ηk ∈ ϒk, for k = 1, . . . ,κ ,
there exists S1:κ ∈Ψ such that
US(η1:κ ,{γω∗1:κ(η1:κ)}ω∈Ω, p) (16a)
=
κ
∑
k=1
Tr
{
Sk
(
∑
ω∈Ω
pωVk(ω)
)}
+ vo, (16b)
where V1:κ(ω) and vo are deterministic parameters that do not depend on S1:κ and derived in Appendix B.
Furthermore, for any S1:κ ∈Ψ, there exists a signaling rule η1:κ such that
κ
∑
k=1
Tr
{
Sk
(
∑
ω∈Ω
pωVk(ω)
)}
+ vo =US(η1:κ ,{γω∗1:κ(η1:κ)}ω∈Ω, p). (17)
4Note that Σok = AΣ
o
k−1A
′+Σw.
8Proof. The proof proceeds as follows: i) we first show that the optimization function can be written as a linear
function of the covariance of the posterior control-free state, i.e.,
Hk := cov{E{xok |s1:k}}, (18)
for k = 1, . . . ,κ; ii) we then identify the necessary condition on H1:κ , which is indeed the constraint set Ψ, i.e.,
H1:κ ∈Ψ; and finally iii) we show that the constraint set Ψ is also a sufficient condition for H1:κ since any point
in Ψ can be attained through certain affine signaling rule. We now provide details of each of these steps.
Step i) Our first goal is to isolate the underlying state from the control input by completing the squares in the
cost functions and through change of variables, which yields the result that given positive semi-definite Qω ∈ Sm
and positive definite Rω ∈ Sr corresponding to the type-ω controller, we have
E
{
κ
∑
k=1
‖xk+1‖2Qω +‖uk‖2Rω
}
=
κ
∑
k=1
E
{
‖uok +Kωk xok‖2∆ωk
}
+∆ω0 , (19)
where Kωk ∈ Rr×m,∆ωk ∈ Sm+, for k = 1, . . . ,κ , and ∆ω0 ∈ R are derived in Appendix A; and {xok} is the control-free
process defined in (15) and
uok = uk +K
ω
k Buk−1+ . . .+K
ω
k A
k−2Bu1. (20)
Remark (Optimality of Linear Signaling Rules). Different from the cooperative settings, (19) does not imply that
the optimal transformed control input is uok = −Kωk E{xok |s1:k} since sk depends on previous control inputs u1:k−1,
as also pointed out in [16]. Therefore, we cannot claim optimality of linear signaling rules within the general class
of all measurable policies. 4
However, for affine signaling rules, e.g., sk = L′k,kxk + . . .+L
′
k,1x1+nk, we have
E{xok |L′1,1x1+n1, · · · ,L′k,kxk + . . .+L′k,1x1+nk}= E{xok |L′1,1xo1+n1, · · · ,L′k,kxok + . . .+L′k,1xo1+nk}, (21)
which holds since the signal sl for l = 1, . . . ,k can be written as
L′l,lxl + . . .+L
′
l,1x1+nl = L
′
l,lx
o
l + . . .+L
′
l,1x
o
1+nl +
{
L′l,lBul−1+ . . .+(L
′
l,lA
l−2+ . . .+L′l,2)Bu1
}
, (22)
where the term in-between {·} is σ -s1:l−1 measurable since the control input is given by (5). This yields that the
optimal transformed control input is given by uok =−Kωk E{xok |s1:k} since E{xok |s1:k} does not depend on u1:k. Then,
the corresponding optimal (original) control input u∗k can be computed based on (20) and u
∗
k is linear in E{xok |s1:k}
while E{xok |s1:k} does not depend on the type of the controller.
Remark (Versatility of the Control Objectives). The result in Step i) would also hold if the controllers have objectives
(other than (8)), e.g., additional certain soft constraints, leading to optimal control inputs that are linear functions
of E{xok |s1:k}. 4
Due to the linearity of the controllers’ reactions in E{xok |s1:k}, the quadratic objective (19) can be written as
κ
∑
k=1
Tr
{
Hk
(
∑
ω∈Ω
pωVk(ω)
)}
+ vo (23)
where V1:κ(ω) ∈ Sm, for ω ∈Ω, and vo ∈ R are derived in Appendix B.
Step ii) The covariance of the posterior control-free state Hk ∈ Sm can be in-between two extremes: Σok corre-
sponding to full disclosure of the state, i.e., sk = xk; and E{E{xok |s1:k−1}E{xok |s1:k−1}′} = AHk−1A′ corresponding
to sharing nothing, i.e., sk = 0 [16]. The inequality
Σok  Hk  AHk−1A′ (24)
follows from the following covariance matrices:
cov{xok−E{xok |s1:k}}= Σok−Hk  O,
cov{E{xok |s1:k}−E{xok |s1:k−1}}= Hk−AHk−1A′  O,
9since for arbitrary random variables a and b,
E{aE{a|b}}= E{E{a|b}E{a|b}}.
We then arrive at (16) based on (24).
Step iii) In order to show (17), we will be using the following lemma from [21] to address the cases when
Σok−AΣok−1A′ = Σw  O can be singular.
Lemma 1 ( [21]). If we can partition a positive semi-definite matrix into blocks such that a block at the diagonal
is a zero matrix, then we have [
A B
B′ O
]
 O⇔ A O and B = O. (25)
Based on Lemma 1, the following lemma shows that any point in Ψ can be attained by a certain affine signaling
rule.
Lemma 2 (Sufficiency Result). Consider any S1:κ ∈Ψ, and let
Σok−ASk−1A′ = U¯k
[
Λ¯k O
O O
]
U¯ ′k
be the eigen-decomposition such that Λ¯k  O. Let
Tk :=
[
Λ¯1/2k O
]
U¯ ′k(Sk−ASk−1A′)U¯k
[
Λ¯1/2k
O
]
(26)
have the eigen-decomposition Tk = UkΛkU ′k with eigenvalues, e.g.,
5 λk,1, . . . ,λk,tk ∈ [0,1], where tk = rank{Σok −
ASk−1A′}. Then, there exists a memoryless affine signaling rule
yk = L′kxk +nk, for k = 1, . . . ,κ, (27)
where nk ∼ N(0,Θk) and Θk = diag{θ 21,1, . . . ,θ 21,tk ,0, . . . ,0}, Lk is given by
Lk = U¯k
[
Λ¯−1/2k UkΛ
o
k O
O O
]
(28)
where Λok := diag{λ o1,1, . . . ,λ o1,tk} and
(λ ok,i)
2
(λ ok,i)2+θ
2
k,i
= λk,i ∈ [0,1],∀ i = 1. . . . , tk, (29)
which leads to S1:κ = H1:κ .
Proof. The proof follows by induction. If S1:κ ∈Ψ, then S1 ∈ Sm satisfies
Σo1  S1  O, (30)
where Σo1  O can be singular. Let Σok = U¯1
[
Λ¯1 O
O O
]
U¯ ′1 be the eigen-decomposition such that Λ¯1  O. Then, we
have [
Λ¯1 O
O O
]
 U¯ ′1S1U¯1  O, (31)
which implies that [
Λ¯1 O
O O
]
−
[
M1,1 M1,2
M2,1 M2,2
]
 O, (32)
where we let U¯ ′1S1U¯1 =
[
M1,1 M1,2
M2,1 M2,2
]
be the corresponding partitioning. Note that since U¯ ′1S1U¯1  O, we have
M2,2  O [22]. However, the bottom-right block of the positive semi-definite matrix (the whole term) on the left-
hand-side of the inequality (32), i.e., −M2,2, must also be a positive semi-definite matrix, which implies OM2,2.
5We do not assume that its eigenvalues are necessarily in [0,1]. But actually, they turn out to be in [0,1].
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Therefore we have M2,2 =O and Lemma 1 yields that there exists a symmetric matrix T1 ∈ St1 , where t1 := rank{Σo1},
such that
S1 = U¯1
[
Λ¯1/21 T1Λ¯
1/2
1 O
O O
]
U¯ ′1. (33)
Note that there exists a bijective relation between S1 ∈ Sm and T1 ∈ St1 . Furthermore, (30) and (33) imply that
I  T1  O, (34)
and T1 ∈ Sm has eigenvalues in the closed interval [0,1] since the eigenvalues of I, i.e., the vector 1 ∈ Rt1 , weakly
majorizes the eigenvalues of T1 from below [22]. Let T1 =U1Λ1U ′1 be the eigen-decomposition and λ1,1, . . . ,λ1,t1 ∈
[0,1] be the associated eigenvalues.
Furthermore, consider the affine signaling rule s1 = L′1x1 +n1, where n1 ∼ N(0,Θ1) is independent of all the
other parameters. Then, the covariance of the posterior control-free state is given by
H1 = Σo1L1(L
′
1Σ
o
1L1+Θ1)
†L′1Σ
o
1. (35)
If we set L1 = U¯1
[
Λ¯−1/21 U1Λ
o
1 O
O O
]
and Θ1  O such that
Λo1 :=
λ
o
1,1
. . .
λ o1,t1
 ,Θ1 :=

θ 21,1
. . .
θ 21,t1
. . .
 (36)
and
(λ o1,i)
2
(λ o1,i)2+θ
2
1,i
= λ1,i ∈ [0,1], for i = 1, . . . , t1, (37)
then, we would obtain H1 = S1 exactly.
Suppose that H j = S j for j < k. Then, Sk ∈ Sm satisfies
Σok  Sk  ASk−1A′, (38)
which is equivalent to
Σok  Sk  AHk−1A′. (39)
Correspondingly, Σok−AHk−1A′O can be singular. Let Σok−AHk−1A′= U¯k
[
Λ¯k O
O O
]
U¯ ′k be the eigen-decomposition
such that Λ¯k  O. Then, we have [
Λ¯k O
O O
]
 U¯ ′k(Sk−AHk−1A′)U¯k  O (40)
and correspondingly Lemma 1 yields that there exists a symmetric matrix Tk ∈ Stk , where tk := rank{Σok−AHk−1A′},
such that
Sk = AHk−1A′+U¯k
[
Λ¯1/2k TkΛ¯
1/2
k O
O O
]
U¯ ′k. (41)
Furthermore, (39) and (41) yield that
I  Tk  O, (42)
which implies that Tk ∈ Stk has eigenvalues in the closed interval [0,1]. Let Tk =UkΛkU ′k be the eigen decomposition
and λk,1, . . . ,λk,tk ∈ [0,1] be the associated eigenvalues.
Furthermore, for the affine signaling rule sk = L′kxk +nk, where nk ∼ N(0,Θk) is independent of all the other
parameters, the covariance of the posterior control-free state is given by
Hk = AHk−1A′+(Σok−AHk−1A′)Lk(L′k(Σok−AHk−1A′)Lk +Θk)†L′k(Σok−AHk−1A′), (43)
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which follows since
cov{E{xok |s1:k}}= cov{E{xok |s1:k−1}}+ cov{E{xok |sk−E{sk|s1:k−1}}}, (44)
due to the independence of the jointly Gaussian s1:k−1 and sk−E{sk|s1:k−1}. If we set Lk = U¯k
[
Λ¯−1/2k UkΛ
o
k O
O O
]
and Θk  O such that
(λ ok,i)
2
(λ ok,i)2+θ
2
k,i
= λk,i ∈ [0,1], for i = 1, . . . , tk, (45)
then, we would obtain Hk = Sk exactly. Therefore, by induction, we conclude that for any S1:κ ∈Ψ, there exists a
certain affine signaling rule such that Hk = Sk for k = 1, . . . ,κ .
Remark (Memory vs Memoryless). When S has perfect measurements, i.e., yk = xk, then the optimal signaling rules
can be memoryless affine policies within the general class of affine policies with complete/bounded memory. 4
Lemma 2 implies the equality at (17), which completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Henceforth, we will be working with (16b) instead of (16a) while analyzing the equilibrium of the game G .
New notation for compact presentation: Let
S :=
Sκ . . .
S1
 , V (ω) :=
Vκ(ω) . . .
V1(ω)
 ,
and Ψ¯ ∈ Smκ be the set corresponding to the constraint set Ψ in this new high dimensional space, i.e., Rmκ×mκ .
Furthermore, let Vi =V (ωi) and pi := pωi , where i ∈I and I is certain index set of the type set Ω.
Based on Theorem 1, at the Stackelberg equilibrium, where S is the leader, S faces the following problem:
min
S∈Ψ¯
max
p∈∆|Ω|
Tr
{
S ∑
i∈I
piVi
}
+ vo, (46)
since A reacts to the committed signaling rule η1:κ and correspondingly reacts to S ∈ Ψ¯. (46) can also be written
as
min
S∈Ψ¯
max
p∈∆|Ω| ∑i∈I
piTr{SVi}+ vo. (47)
The following proposition addresses the existence of an equilibrium for G .
Proposition 1 (Existence Result). There exists at least one tuple of pure actions (η∗1:κ ,{γω∗1:κ(η1:κ)}ω∈Ω, p∗(η1:κ))
attaining the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game G , i.e., satisfying (12).
Proof. The proof follows from the equivalence between (16a) and (16b), which yields that S faces (47). Since the
objective function in (47) is continuous in the optimization arguments and the constraint sets are decoupled and
compact, the extreme value theorem and maximum theorem (showing the continuity of parametric maximization
under certain conditions [23]) yields the existence of a solution to (47), which completes the proof.
Remark (Affine vs Linear). The objective function in (47) is linear in the optimization argument S ∈ Ψ¯, and the
constraint set Ψ¯ is compact and convex. Therefore, given p∈∆|Ω|, the solution could be attained at a certain extreme
point of Ψ¯. However, the following function:
max
p∈∆|Ω| ∑i∈I
piTr{SVi} (48)
is convex in S ∈ Ψ¯ since the maximum of any family of linear functions is a convex function [20]. Particularly, for
µ ∈ [0,1], we have
µ max
p∈∆|Ω|
Tr
{
S∑
i
piVi
}
+(1−µ) max
p∈∆|Ω|
Tr
{
S¯∑
i
piVi
}
≥ max
p∈∆|Ω|
Tr
{
(µS+(1−µ)S¯)∑
i
piVi
}
.
12
Therefore, the solution can be a non-extreme point of the constraint set Ψ¯. Correspondingly, Lemma 2 implies
that the optimal signals would be affine in the underlying state rather than linear, i.e., there will be additional
independent noise term nk ∼ N(0,Θk), where Θk 6= O. 4
Next, we seek to compute the equilibrium of G . To this end, we examine the equilibrium conditions further. In
particular, according to (47), given S ∈ Ψ¯, the best action for A is given by
p∗ ∈
{
p ∈ ∆|Ω| | p j = 0 if Tr{VjS}< max
i
Tr{ViS}
}
(49)
since (47) is linear in p ∈ ∆|Ω|. Then, based on the observation (49), the following theorem provides an algorithm
to compute the robust sensor outputs.
Theorem 2 (Computing the Equilibrium). The value of the Stackelberg equilibrium (47) is given by ϑ =min j∈I {ϑ j},
where
ϑ j := min
S∈Ψ¯
Tr
{
VjS
}
+ vo (50)
s.t. Tr
{
(Vj−Vi)S
}≥ 0 ∀i ∈I .
Furthermore, let ϑ j∗ = ϑ and
S∗ ∈ argmin
S∈Ψ¯
Tr
{
Vj∗S
}
+ vo (51)
s.t. Tr
{
(Vj∗−Vi)S
}≥ 0 ∀i ∈I .
Then, given S∗ ∈ Ψ¯, the optimal signaling rule η1:κ can be computed according to (27) from Lemma 2.
Proof. Based on the existence result in Proposition 1, suppose that (S∗, p∗) attains the Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e.,
solves (47). Since p∗ ∈ ∆|Ω|, there must be at least one type with positive weight. As an example, suppose positive
weight for the type ω j ∈Ω, i.e., p j > 0. This implies that
Tr{VjS∗} ≥ Tr{ViS∗} ∀i (52)
since Tr{VjS∗}= maxi∈I Tr{ViS∗} by (49). Furthermore, this also implies that
Tr{VjS∗}= ∑
i∈I
p∗i Tr{ViS∗} (53)
since if p∗i > 0, then we have
Tr{VjS∗}= Tr{ViS∗}. (54)
These necessary conditions yield that
min
S∈Ψ¯
max
p∈∆|Ω| ∑i∈I
Tr{ViS}pi = min
S∈Ψ¯
Tr{VjS}
s.t. Tr{(Vj−Vi)S} ≥ 0 ∀i (55)
while the right-hand-side is an SDP problem isolated from A’s action. Therefore, by searching over the index set
I , we can compute the left-hand-side, which is the minimum over I . Once the minimum value is computed, S∗
can be computed according to the corresponding index, i.e., (51).
Remark. In Theorem 2, we search over the index set I linearly, however, certain pruning operations can be
conducted to speed up the computation. As an example, we can search over the extreme points of the convex hull
of Vj, j ∈I . 4
Remark. There might be multiple solutions for (51). S can be selective among those solutions. In particular, (47)
implies that S minimizes the cost given that A maximizes it. Therefore, if the true underlying distribution is not
the worst possible distribution, then S would not get a cost more than the anticipated one. Any deviation from the
worst distribution benefits S. Furthermore, in the worst case, A assigns positive probabilities to the types leading
to the maximum as in (49). Correspondingly, if S selects the solution S∗ ∈ Ψ¯ for (51) such that the cardinality of
argmax j Tr{VjS∗} is the smallest, then any positive probability on other types of attacks out of that set would lead
to lower cost and would be desirable. 4
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IV. ROBUST SENSOR DESIGN WITH NOISY OR PARTIAL MEASUREMENTS
In this section, we obtain the optimal signaling rule when there are noisy or partial measurements of the type
(2) by turning the problem to the same structure with the case of perfect measurements based on a recent result
from [24] and then invoking the results from the previous section. There are several challenges in robust sensor
design with noisy or partial measurements. As an example, the sufficiency result on the necessary conditions for
the covariance of the posterior control-free state, i.e., Hk, does not hold in that case. Therefore, our focus will
be on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the covariance of the posterior control-free measurements, i.e.,
cov{E{yok |s1:k}}, where yok :=Cxok +vk. Similar to (21), we can show that
E{yok |s1:k}= E{yok |so1:k}, (56)
where sok := L
′
k,ky
o
k+ . . .+L
′
k,1y
o
1+nk, since u1:k−1 is σ -y1:k−1 measurable. However, {yok} is not necessarily a Markov
process. Therefore, we consider
yok
yok−1
...
yo1
=
=:Ak︷ ︸︸ ︷E{yok(yo1:k−1)′}E{yo1:k−1(yo1:k−1)′}†
I

y
o
k−1
...
yo1
+
yok−E{yok |yo1:k−1}
O

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ek
, (57)
which can also be written in a compact form as
yo1:k = Aky
o
1:k−1+ek, (58)
where we denote the vector
[
(yok)
′ · · · (yo1)′
]′ by yo1:k with some abuse of notation.
Furthermore, we note that xok , y
o
1:k, and s
o
1:k form a Markov chain in the order x
o
k → yo1:k→ so1:k. In that respect,
the following lemma from [24] shows that there exists a linear relation between the posterior estimates irrespective
of the signal if they are jointly Gaussian and form a Markov chain in a certain order.
Lemma 3 ( [24]). Given zero-mean jointly Gaussian random vectors forming a Markov chain, e.g., x→ y→ s in
this order, the posterior estimates of x and y given s satisfy the following linear relation:
E{x|s}= E{xy′}E{yy′}†E{y|s}, (59)
which implies s→ E{y|s}→ E{x|s} in this order.
Based on Lemma 3, we have the following relation between E{xok |so1:k} and E{yo1:k|so1:k}:
E{xok |so1:k}= E{xok(yo1:k)′}E{yo1:k(yo1:k)′}†︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Dk
E{yo1:k|so1:k}, (60)
where Dk ∈ Rm×mk does not depend on the signaling rule η1:k(·). We define
Yk := cov{E{yo1:k|so1:k}}. (61)
Then, (60) yields that
Hk = DkYkD′k. (62)
Correspondingly, (16a), i.e., the problem faced by S, can be written as
min
ηk∈ϒk
k=1,...,κ
κ
∑
k=1
Tr
{
Yk
(
∑
ω∈Ω
pωWk(ω)
)}
+ vo, (63)
where Wk(ω) := D′kV (ω)Dk is also a symmetric matrix. Furthermore, consider the following compact and convex
set:
Φ := {(Sk ∈ Smk)κk=1|Σyk  Sk  AkSk−1A′k,k = 1, . . . ,κ,S0 = O}, (64)
where Σyk := E{yo1:k(yo1:k)′}, C ∈ Rm×m and Σv ∈ Sm.
14
Remark. Note that Σyk ∈ Smk, Ak ∈ Rkm×(k−1)m, and Dk ∈ Rm×mk can be written as
Σyk =
[
O Ik⊗C
]
Σo
[
O
Ik⊗C′
]
+ Ik⊗Σv,
Ak =
[Om×(κ−k)m C Om×(k−1)m]Σo[ OIk−1⊗C′
]
(Σyk−1)
†
I(k−1)m
 ,
Dk =
[
Om×(κ−k)m Im Om×(k−1)m
]
Σo
[
O
Ik⊗C′
]
(Σyk)
†
in terms of Σo ∈ Smκ , defined in Appendix B by (85). 4
Remark (Sufficiency Condition). Without loss of generality, suppose that sk ∈ Rmk instead of sk ∈ Rm such that
S can disclose η˜k(y1:k) = y1:k with the affine signaling rule η˜k(·) from Rmk to Rmk. Particularly, in practice, we can
always set the signaling rule ηk(·) from Rmk to Rm as
ηk(y1:k) = E{xok |η˜1(y1), . . . , η˜k(y1:k)}. (65)
For such a signaling rule η˜k(·), by following similar lines in Step ii) in the proof of Theorem 1, we can show that
a necessary condition on Y1:κ is that Y1:κ ∈ Φ. Furthermore, based on Lemma 2, a sufficient condition on Y1:κ is
that for any S1:κ ∈Φ, there exists a certain signaling rule such that Y1:κ = S1:κ . 4
The following corollary to Theorem 1 provides an equivalent SDP problem for (16a) when there are noisy
measurements.
Corollary 1 (Equivalence Result with Noisy or Partial Measurements). Given p ∈ ∆|Ω|, for any signaling rule η1:κ ,
there exists S1:κ ∈Φ such that
US(η1:κ ,{γω∗1:κ(η1:κ)}ω∈Ω, p) (66)
=
κ
∑
k=1
Tr
{
Sk
(
∑
ω∈Ω
Wk(ω)
)}
+ vo. (67)
Furthermore, for any S1:κ ∈Φ, there exists a signaling rule η1:κ such that
κ
∑
k=1
Tr
{
Sk
(
∑
ω∈Ω
Wk(ω)
)}
+ vo (68)
=US(η1:κ ,{γω∗1:κ(η1:κ)}ω∈Ω, p). (69)
Based on Corollary 1, the following corollary to Theorem 2 provides an algorithm to compute the robust sensor
outputs for the cases with noisy or partial measurements.
Corollary 2 (Computing the Equilibrium with Noisy or Partial Measurements). The value of the Stackelberg
equilibrium
min
S∈Φ¯
max
p∈∆|Ω| ∑i∈I
piTr{WiS}+ vo, (70)
where Wi and Φ¯ are defined accordingly, is given by ϑ = min j∈I {ϑ j}, where
ϑ j := min
S∈Φ¯
Tr
{
WjS
}
+ vo
s.t. Tr
{
(Wj−Wi)S
}≥ 0 ∀i ∈I .
Furthermore, let ϑ j∗ = ϑ and
S∗ ∈ argmin
S∈Φ¯
Tr
{
Wj∗S
}
+ vo
s.t. Tr
{
(Wj∗−Wi)S
}≥ 0 ∀i ∈I .
Then, given S∗ ∈ Φ¯, the optimal signaling rule η˜1:κ can be computed according to (27) from Lemma 2 with
corresponding Σyk and Ak instead of Σ
o
k and A, for k = 1, . . . ,κ , and then we can compute the actual signaling rules
η1:κ via (65).
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V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
As numerical illustrations, we compare the performance of the proposed secure sensor design framework with
classical sensors that disclose the measurement to the controller directly. The controller can have three different
types: type-ωo corresponding to benign controller, and type-α and type-β corresponding to malicious controllers.
As an illustrative example, we set the time horizon κ = 10, the state’s dimension m = 4, and the control input’s
dimension r = 2. We consider that the state can be partitioned into the separate processes {t k ∈R2} and {zk ∈R2},
i.e., x′k =
[
t ′k z
′
k
]
, and the state recursion is given by[
t k+1
zk+1
]
=
[
At O
O Az
][
t k
zk
]
+
[
Bt
O
]
uk +
[
wtk
wzk
]
, (71)
where
At :=
[
1/
√
2 0
0 1/2
]
, Az :=
[
1/3 1/10
1/10 1/
√
2
]
, Bt :=
[
1 1
0 1
]
.
Furthermore, we let the initial state x1 ∼ N(0,Σ1) and the state noise wk ∼ N(0,Σw) have the covariance matrices:
Σ1 :=

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1.5 0
0 0 0 2
 , Σw :=

1 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 0.98 −0.228
0 0 −0.228 0.985
 ,
which implies {zk} is a stationary exogenous process. The benign controller objective is given by
κ
∑
k=1
∥∥∥∥[t k+1−zk+1t k+1
]∥∥∥∥2+‖uk‖2, (72)
which implies that type-ωo controller and S seek to regularize the controlled process {t k} around the zero vector and
the exogenous process {zk}. On the other hand, the other malicious type controllers’ objectives are misaligned with
(72) rather than being its complete opposite. Let t k =
[
t (1)k t
(2)
k
]′
. Then, type-α C seeks to regularize {t (1)k ∈ R}
around zero and thus his control objective is given by
κ
∑
k=1
∥∥∥t (1)k+1∥∥∥2+‖uk‖2. (73)
Type-β C seeks to regularize the other component of t k, {t (2)k ∈R}, again around zero and thus his control objective
is given by
κ
∑
k=1
∥∥∥t (2)k+1∥∥∥2+‖uk‖2. (74)
We consider four different scenarios in terms of the measurements:
• Scenario-1: Perfect Measurements, i.e., yk = xk.
• Scenario-2: Noisy Measurements, i.e., yk = xk +vk.
• Scenario-3: Partial Measurements, i.e., yk =Cxk.
• Scenario-4: Partial Noisy Measurements, i.e.,
yk =Cxk +vk.
We let vk ∼ N(0, I4) and
C :=

1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
 , (75)
which is a singular matrix. In Tables I-IV, we compare the performance of the secure sensor design framework
with the classical sensors in terms of the following performance metric:
max
p∈∆|Ω|
κ
∑
k=1
Tr
{
Hk ∑
ω∈Ω
pωVk(ω)
}
, (76)
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TABLE I: Scenario-1: Perfect Measurements. Comparison of the costs between secure sensor design and full
information disclosure for the cases with different sets of types. Note that lower cost is desirable.
Almost-surely One Malicious
All Together
One Type with Benign Type
Secure Full Secure Full Secure Full
ty
pe
-α
−18.19 −14.63
−18.19 −14.63
−12.23 −3.95
ty
pe
-ω
o
−28.66 −28.66
−12.37 −3.95
ty
pe
-β
−12.37 −3.95
i.e., in terms of the impact of the sensor feedback and for the worst possible distribution over the controllers’ types,
based on Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 while V1:κ(ω), for ω ∈Ω, is derived in Appendix B.
Remark (Performance Metric). Note that the performance metric (76) excludes vo ∈ R from the original cost
function (17) in perfect measurements case or (68) in partial or noisy measurements case since vo ∈ R does not
depend on how the measurements have been shared with the controller, and therefore is fixed for all the scenarios.
Correspondingly, the performance metric could be negative while the original cost function is always non-negative
by definition. 4
Across Tables I-IV, i.e., across all Scenarios 1-4, we have the following observations in common: i) the proposed
framework outperforms the classical sensors that disclose the (perfect or noisy) measurements directly without any
crafting; ii) the cost for the proposed framework and the classical full disclosure strategy is the same when there
is only benign type almost surely; iii) the benign type C is dominated by both type-α C and type-β C in the worst
distribution, i.e., benign type has zero probability almost surely in the worst distribution; iv) type-β C is stronger
attacker than type-α C by leading to higher cost.
As seen in Table I, in Scenario-1, the cost of the proposed framework for all the cases, i.e., for different sets
of types, is the smallest compared to the other scenarios, where there can be partial or noisy measurements.
Particularly, the perfect measurements give the utmost freedom to S to select the signaling rule. Therefore, if there
were any other case with partial or noisy measurements, where S achieves lower cost, then S could have selected
that corresponding composed signaling rule in the case with perfect measurement. Partial or noisy measurements
limit S’s ability to deceive the attackers. Furthermore, we observe that when all the types can exist with a positive
probability, the cost is higher than the cases when only one attacker exists. This yields that the worst distribution
to defend against is not dominated by the strongest attacker, who is type-β C in this scenario. In other words, the
possibility of a mixture over the stronger and weaker attackers can be more powerful.
In Scenarios 2 and 3, as seen in Tables II and III, the performance degrades compared to Scenario 1 in the
proposed framework. However, such a performance degradation is not the case for the full information disclosure
in general. As an example, when there is only type-β C almost surely, the cost is higher in Scenario 3 than the
one in Scenario 1 for full disclosure of the measurement. This is mainly because the objectives of the malicious
type controller is not the complete opposite of the benign type controller. Therefore, even though in all the cases
illustrated in this section, we have observed that there can even be examples, where the full disclosure of the
measurement can lead to a positive cost, which would imply that disclosing even no information with the controller
would lead to lower cost, i.e., 0, since no information disclosure yields that the covariance of the posterior control-
free state is Hk =O. Furthermore, we observe that the possibility of a mixture over the stronger and weaker attackers
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TABLE II: Scenario-2: Noisy Measurements. Comparison of the costs between secure sensor design and full
information disclosure for the cases with different sets of types.
Almost-surely One Malicious
All Together
One Type with Benign Type
Secure Full Secure Full Secure Full
ty
pe
-α
−12.59 −10.13
−12.59 −10.13
−8.71 −2.86
ty
pe
-ω
o
−20.16 −20.16
−8.85 −2.86
ty
pe
-β −8.85 −2.86
TABLE III: Scenario-3: Partial Measurements. Comparison of the costs between secure sensor design and full
information disclosure for the cases with different sets of types.
Almost-surely One Malicious
All Together
One Type with Benign Type
Secure Full Secure Full Secure Full
ty
pe
-α
−12.15 −10.42
−12.15 −10.42
−12.09 −10.40
ty
pe
-ω
o
−18.91 −18.91
−12.11 −10.40
ty
pe
-β
−12.11 −10.40
can also be more powerful in Scenarios 2 and 3.
In Scenario-4, as seen in Table IV, the cost for the case when there is only the benign type is the highest.
However, while the costs for the cases when there is only type-α attacker is higher than the corresponding cases
in Scenario-2, the costs for the cases when there is only type-β attacker is lower than the corresponding cases in
Scenario-2. Note that type-β attacker is still stronger than type-α attacker by leading to higher cost. Furthermore,
the costs for the case when all the types can exist with a positive probability also leads to a similar twist, where
we observe a higher cost in Scenario-2. We also note that type-β attacker dominates the worst distribution over
all the types since the costs for the case where there is only type-β is the same with the cost for the case when
there are all types. Therefore, we can conclude that depending on the type of controllers and how informative the
measurements are, the costs can vary in a complicated way while the proposed framework provides the optimal
way to compute the robust sensor outputs and a performance assessment tool for, e.g., various sensor placement
techniques.
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TABLE IV: Scenario-4: Partial Noisy Measurements. Comparison of the costs between secure sensor design and
full information disclosure for the cases with different sets of types.
Almost-surely One Malicious
All Together
One Type with Benign Type
Secure Full Secure Full Secure Full
ty
pe
-α −9.94 −8.73
−9.94 −8.73
−9.75 −8.55
ty
pe
-ω
o
−14.89 −14.89
−9.75 −8.55
ty
pe
-β −9.75 −8.55
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed and addressed the robust sensor design problem for cyber-physical systems with
linear Gaussian dynamics against multiple advanced and evasive attackers with quadratic control objectives. By
designing sensor outputs cautiously in advance, we have sought to deceive the attackers about the underlying state
of the system so that they would act/attack to the system in-line with the normal operation. Our goal has been to
exploit the aligned part between the attackers’ and the system’s objectives so that the attackers would only have
fulfilled the aligned part by crafting the information available to them. To this end, we have modeled the problem
formally in a game-theoretical hierarchical setting, where the advanced attackers can be aware of the designed
signaling rules.
We have formulated an equivalent problem to the problem faced by the sensor against any attacker with a
known objective. This new problem was an SDP problem. We have introduced additional linear constraints on that
equivalent problem and provided an SDP algorithm to compute the optimal robust sensor design strategies against
multiple types of attackers. We have also extended the results to scenarios where the sensor could have access to
partial or noisy measurements of the underlying state. Finally, we have examined the performance of the proposed
framework across various scenarios and compared with the classical sensor outputs that disclose the measurements
directly without any crafting.
Some future directions of research on this topic include formulation of secure sensor design strategies for robust
control of systems, and considering scenarios where the attackers can have side information about the underlying
state, which would limit the sensor’s ability to deceive the attackers. Another interesting research direction would
be the application of the framework to sensor placement or sensor selection. Furthermore, even though we have
motivated the framework by relating it to security, the framework could also address strategic information disclosure
over multi-agent control networks with misaligned control objectives.
APPENDIX
A. Computation of Kω1:κ ,∆
ω
1:κ , and ∆
ω
0
A routine completion to square leads to [25], [26]
E
{
κ
∑
k=1
‖xk+1‖2Qω +‖uk‖2Rω
}
=
κ
∑
k=1
E
{
‖uk +Kωk xk‖2∆ωk
}
+∆ω0 , (77)
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where
Kωk = (∆
ω
k )
−1B′Q˜ωk+1A (78)
∆ωk = B
′Q˜ωk+1B+Rω (79)
∆ω0 = Tr{QωΣ1}+
κ
∑
k=1
Tr{Q˜ωk+1Σw} (80)
and {Q˜ωk } is given by the discrete-time dynamic Riccati equation
Q˜ωk = Qω +A
′(Q˜ωk+1− Q˜ωk+1B(∆ωk )−1B′Q˜ωk+1)A
and Q˜ωκ+1 = Qω .
B. Computation of V1:κ(ω) and vo
Let ωo ∈Ω denote the type of the benign controller, who has the same objective with S. We define
Φ(ω) :=

I Kωκ B K
ω
κ AB · · · Kωκ Aκ−2B
I Kωκ−1B · · · Kωκ−1Aκ−3B
I · · · Kωκ−2Aκ−4B
. . .
...
I

K(ω) :=
K
ω
κ
. . .
Kω1
 , ∆(ω) :=
∆
ω
κ
. . .
∆ω1
 .
Then, (77) can be written as
‖Φ(ω)u+K(ω)xo‖2∆(ω)+∆ω0 (81)
in terms of the augmented vectors u,xo ∈Rmκ . Correspondingly, the optimal attack is u∗=−Φ(ω)−1K(ω)xˆo, where
xˆo :=
[
E{xoκ |s1:κ}′ · · · E{xo1|s1}′
]′, for type-ω controller. Therefore, S, i.e., type-ωo, faces the following problem:
∑
ω∈Ω
pω‖K(ωo)xo−T (ω)xˆo‖∆(ωo)+∆ωo0 , (82)
where T (ω) :=Φ(ωo)Φ(ω)−1K(ω). We introduce
Ξ(ω) := T (ω)′∆(ωo)T (ω)−T (ω)′∆(ωo)K(ωo)−K(ωo)′∆(ωo)T (ω) (83)
vo := Tr{ΣoK(ωo)′∆(ωo)K(ωo)}+∆ωo0 , (84)
where Σo := E{xo(xo)′} is given by
Σo :=

Σoκ AΣoκ−1 · · · Aκ−1Σo1
Σoκ−1A
′ Σoκ−1 A
κ−2Σo1
...
. . .
...
Σo1(A
κ−1)′ Σo1(A
κ−2)′ · · · Σo1
 . (85)
Note that vo ∈ R does not depend on the types of the controllers. Then, (82) can be written as
∑
ω∈Ω
pωTr{E{xˆo(xˆo)′}Ξ(ω)}+ vo, (86)
where we have
E{xˆo(xˆo)′} :=

Hκ AHκ−1 · · · Aκ−1H1
Hκ−1A′ Hκ−1 Aκ−2H1
...
. . .
...
H1(Aκ−1)′ H1(Aκ−2)′ · · · H1
 .
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Therefore, the corresponding Vk(ω) ∈ Sm in (23) is given by
Vk(ω) = Ξk,k(ω)+
κ
∑
l=k+1
Ξk,l(ω)Al−k +(Al−k)′Ξl,k(ω), (87)
where Ξk,l(ω) ∈ Rm×m is an m×m block of Ξ(ω), with indexing from the right-bottom to the left-top.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Giraldo, E. Sarkar, A. A. Cardenas, M. Maniatakos, and M. Kantarcioglu, “Security and privacy in cyber-physical systems: A survey
of surveys,” IEEE Design & Test, vol. 34, pp. 7–17, 2017.
[2] A. Humayed, J. Lin, F. Li, and B. Luo, “Cyber-physical systems security – A survey,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 4, no. 6,
2017.
[3] N. Nelson, “The impact of Dragonfly malware on industrial control systems,” The SANS Institute, 2016.
[4] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter, “False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids,” ACM Trans. Information
and System Security, vol. 14, no. 1, 2009.
[5] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “Secure control against replay attacks,” in Proc. 47th Allerton Conf. Communication, Control, and Computing,
2009.
[6] Y. Mo, R. Chabukswar, and B. Sinopoli, “Detecting integrity attacks on SCADA systems,” IEEE Trans. Control Syst. Tech., vol. 22,
no. 4, 2014.
[7] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “Integrity attacks on cyber-physical systems,” in Proc. 1st ACM Int. Conf. High Confidence Networked Systems,
2012, pp. 47–54.
[8] ——, “On the performance degradation of cyber-physical systems under stealthy integrity attacks,” IEEE Trans. Automatic Control,
vol. 61, no. 9, pp. 2618–2624, 2016.
[9] A. Teixeira, I. Shames, H. Sandberg, and K. H. Johansson, “Revealing stealthy attacks in control systems,” in Proc. 50th Allerton Conf.
Communication, Control, and Computing, 2012.
[10] F. Pasqualetti, F. Do¨rfler, and F. Bullo, “Attack detection and identification in cyber-physical systems,” IEEE Trans. Automatic Control,
vol. 58, no. 11, 2013.
[11] H. Fawzi, P. Tabuada, and S. Diggavi, “Secure estimation and control for cyber physical systems under adversarial attacks,” IEEE
Trans. Autom. Control, vol. 59, no. 6, pp. 1454–1467, 2014.
[12] Y. Chen, S. Kar, and J. M. F. Moura, “Cyber physical attacks with control objectives and detection constraints,” in Proc. 55th IEEE
Conf. on Decision and Control (CDC), 2016, pp. 1125–1130.
[13] ——, “Cyber physical attacks constrained by control objectives,” in Proc. Americal Control Conference (ACC), 2016, pp. 1185–1190.
[14] R. Zhang and P. Venkitasubramaniam, “Stealthy control signal attacks in linear quadratic Gaussian control systems: Detectability reward
tradeoff,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics and Security, vol. 12, no. 7, pp. 1555–1570, 2017.
[15] F. Miao, Q. Zhu, M. Pajic, and G. J. Pappas, “Coding schemes for securing cyber-physical systems against stealthy data injection
attacks,” IEEE Trans. Automatic Control, 2017.
[16] M. O. Sayin, E. Akyol, and T. Bas¸ar, “Hierarchical multi-stage Gaussian signaling games: Strategic communication and control,”
arXiv:1609.09448, 2017.
[17] M. O. Sayin and T. Bas¸ar, “Secure sensor design for cyber-physical systems against advanced persistent threats,” in Proceedings
of International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security on Lecture Notes in Computer Science, S. Rass, B. An,
C. Kiekintveld, F. Fang, and S. Schauder, Eds., vol. 10575. Vienna, Austria: Springer, Oct. 2017, pp. 91–111.
[18] ——, “Secure sensor design against undetected infiltration: Minimum impact-minimum damage,” arXiv:1801.01630, 2018.
[19] T. Bas¸ar and G. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. Society for Industrial Mathematics (SIAM) Series in Classics in
Applied Mathematics, 1999.
[20] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[21] M. O. Sayin and T. Bas¸ar, “Dynamic information disclosure for deception,” in Proceedings of the 57th IEEE Conference on Decision
and Control (CDC), 2018.
[22] R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson, Matrix Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 1985.
[23] E. Ok, Real Analysis with Economics Applications. Princeton University Press, 2007.
[24] M. O. Sayin and T. Bas¸ar, “Deceptive multi-dimensional information disclosure over a Gaussian channel,” in Proceedings of the
American Control Conference (ACC), 2018, pp. 6545–6552.
[25] R. Bansal and T. Bas¸ar, “Simultaneous design of measurement and control strategies for stochastic systems with feedback,” Automatica,
vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 679–694, 1989.
[26] P. R. Kumar and P. Varaiya, Stochastic Systems. Prentice-Hall, 1986.
